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SELECTIVE SUBSIDIARITY AND
DIALECTIC DEFERENCE IN THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION
TOMER BROUDE*
I
INTRODUCTION: TURNING THE TABLES ON/OF SUBSIDIARITY
Whom, not what, or which purpose—does subsidiarity serve in international
governance? Whom does it empower? Subsidiarity, generally, is the normative
concept whereby rules and policies are better deliberated, devised, and
1
determined at lower rather than higher levels of authority and interest, unless
2
convincing reasons exist to prefer otherwise. These reasons often include some
kinds of efficiency or legitimacy considerations, or both, as determinative
3
benchmarks. Moreover, subsidiarity is usually presumed to be an instrument
for preserving and maintaining the influence of the local in the face of the
4
increasing power of centralized, multilateral, and global institutions. In this
vein, subsidiarity appears to cut overarching structures of global governance
down to their proper size, balancing their otherwise prevailing power, while
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1. “Subsidiarity” evokes vertical terminology. See generally René Urueña, Subsidiary and the
Public–Private Distinction in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016,
at 99, 101–02. However, subsidiarity also has horizontal (inter-regime) applications. See Robert Howse
& Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16
GOVERNANCE 73, 75 (2005). Moreover, subsidiarity could also be perceived in spatial rather than
linear terms. See Joel P. Trachtman, Trade and . . . Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity, 9
EUR. J. INT’L L. 32, 34 (1998).
2. This is necessarily a caricature of the breadth of subsidiarity’s forms. See Markus Jachtenfuchs
& Nico Krisch, Subsidiarity in Global Governance, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 1;
Andreas Føllesdal, Competing Conceptions of Subsidiarity, in NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND
SUBSIDIARITY 214, 219–26 (James E. Fleming & Jacob T. Levy eds., 2014); Isabel Feichtner,
Subsidiarity, in 9 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 652, 653–57
(Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012). Thus, for example, the default allocation of authority may differ:
subsidiarity can either determine when authority devolves from central to local, or when authority
reserved to the local is nevertheless reallocated to the central.
3. See, e.g., Jenna Bednar, Subsidiarity and Robustness: Building the Adaptive Efficiency of
Federal Systems, in NOMOS LV: FEDERALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY, supra note 2, at 231 (explaining
subsidiarity in federal systems as a method of enhancing adaptive efficiency, not only general social
welfare).
4. See Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 6–7 (depicting subsidiarity as a presumption in
favor of lower-level decisionmaking).
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seemingly alleviating, if not curing, the democratic deficits inherent in
international organization. In other words, the story goes, global strata of
governance sacrifice some of their powers (actual or potential) through
subsidiarity, empowering more localized elements (such as regional groupings,
states, provinces, or municipalities) where the exercise of the latter’s authority
and decision-making processes would be more effective and legitimate.
At least when applied to the World Trade Organization (WTO)—a prime
5
multilateral (indeed, almost universal) regime of norms and institutions, whose
overarching purpose is to encourage states to reduce the barriers they impose
6
on international trade in goods and services for mutual benefit —this
idealization of subsidiarity encounters some revealing difficulties and
complications, which tell us much about the operability of subsidiarity in
general.
On the one hand, the WTO has no executive powers or authority
independent of its Membership, and in practice it does not exercise formally
binding decision-making competences beyond the adjudication of its own rules
and the authorization of their enforcement through its much-vaunted dispute
settlement system. Contrary to the European Union (EU) and its model of
7
subsidiarity, with all of its baggage, the WTO, which does not engage in direct,
positive regulation, has few effective legislative or even quasi-legislative
procedures and hardly ever “acts” in any traditional manner. The WTO is, as is
the truism, a “Member-driven” organization, at least in the sense that
“Members are part of the international organization (for example, through
rulemaking) and at the same time act outside the [international organization]
8
(for example, through implementation),” with a heavy emphasis on consensus
9
rulemaking associated with normative stagnation and institutional paralysis.
There is, therefore, from a somewhat positivist perspective, something
discordant from the outset in discussing subsidiarity in the context of the WTO
(or the WTO in the context of subsidiarity). If the paramount global trade
regulation forum actually holds little formal authority, is the default not that all
powers remain vested with states, subject to their political interactions within
the organization and outside of it? How is subsidiarity, then, of any relevance?
On the other hand, notwithstanding the paucity of formal powers over its
5. The WTO currently has 162 Members, including 159 states and three “Separate Customs
Territories.” See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
6. This both generalizes and simplifies; for a nuanced discussion of the goals of trade agreements,
see generally KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM (2002).
7. See generally Paul Craig, Subsidiarity: A Political and Legal Analysis, 50 J. COMMON MKT.
STUD. 72–87 (2012).
8. See Manfred Elsig, The World Trade Organization at Work: Performance in a Member-Driven
Milieu, 5 REV. INT’L ORG. 345, 346 (2010).
9. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Decision-Making in the WTO: Is the Consensus
Practice of the WTO Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules on International Trade?, 8
J. INT’L ECON. L. 51, 53 (2005).
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Members, the WTO is an important—to some, even a looming and
10
threatening —agent of global governance. At times, the engagement of the
WTO dispute settlement system with (and intrusion into) significant domestic
public policy issues that transcend mere trade flows, such as public health (for
11
example, national tobacco control measures) or public morals (for example,
12
import bans related to animal welfare), is sufficient testament to this. To be
sure, this is negative power (the power to overrule), rather than positive
authority (the power to rule), but in any case, the WTO would appear to hold
much greater influence in practice than the law on the books would tell us.
Thus, despite the absence of a strict ordering system or a clear normative
hierarchy within the organization, the concept of subsidiarity may hold the
potential for some traction in the WTO system, serving a necessary authorityallocation function. However framed or depicted, the WTO undoubtedly
possesses influence that interacts with the lower decision-making entities of its
Members. Yet the default locus of power, as well as the mechanisms of
allocation, remains unclearly defined in formal terms, and indeed contested. For
the WTO dispute settlement organs, the point of departure is that the WTO
Agreements prevail as the international law of the organization, whereas for
national governments, there is a presumption of sovereignty (followed by
continued—often feigned—astonishment when the constraints imposed at the
international level become real). At the same time, there exists in the WTO an
13
environment of legislative deferrals, in which many difficult normative issues
are voluntarily, at least by omission, left by the Membership to the judicial
14
branch—the dispute settlement system—to decide.
In these circumstances, the ultimate balance of authority, so to speak, may
be the outcome of dynamic political reflexivities applying between the relevant
actors—especially individual WTO Members, the Membership as a whole, the
dispute settlement system (Panels and the Appellate Body (AB)), and, behind
15
the scenes, the WTO Secretariat —rather than any structured or otherwise
reasoned forms of subsidiarity or mutual deference. In such cases, the
distinction between weak and strong types of subsidiarity, depending on the
“threshold” for rebutting the presumption in favor of the lower level of
10. On antiglobalist concerns, see Tomer Broude, From Seattle to Occupy: The Shifting Focus of
Social Protest, in LINKING GLOBAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW POLICY SPACE IN HARD
ECONOMIC TIMES 91–107 (Daniel Drache & Lesley A. Jacobs eds., 2014).
11. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of
Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 13, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (adopted Apr. 4, 2012).
12. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation
and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶¶ 5.194–.203, WTO Doc. WT/DS/401/AB/R (adopted May 23, 2014).
13. In another context, see generally GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS:
STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2010) (arguing that
within American politics, lawmakers in some circumstances invite the Court to make policy decisions).
14. See TOMER BROUDE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE WTO: JUDICIAL BOUNDARIES
AND POLITICAL CAPITULATION 34, 306 (2004).
15. See Sikinah Jinna, Overlap Management in the WTO: Secretariat Influence on TradeEnvironment Politics, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 54, 71–74 (2010).
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decisionmaking, as suggested in this issue’s framing article, is barely
applicable—at least to the extent that the subsidiary entities actually prefer
decisions to be made over their heads, at the organizational level. Furthermore,
this observation casts more than a mere shadow of doubt on the normative
prescriptiveness of subsidiarity, at least in the WTO setting and perhaps more
broadly. To be fair, though, in the WTO, most forms of subsidiarity-like
mechanisms (as we shall soon see) are implied rather than explicit. In any case,
the preference of subsidiary entities for higher-level decisionmaking also shows
17
that the demand for subsidiarity is not a one-way street. In a multilevel system
of governance, the lower levels might actually clamor for greater centralization,
while at the same time the higher levels prefer (or demand) devolution.
Having said all this, in ways that are not entirely unlike international law
18
more generally, but compounded by particular trade-land phenomena (such as
19
the malaise in multilateral rule development in the ill-fated Doha Round) and
20
institutional competition from regional and plurilateral machinations, the
WTO seems to be plagued by an existential fear of irrelevance, despite its
unquestionable actual influence. The WTO is constantly in need of approbation
and maintenance of its legitimacy, both internal (vis-à-vis its own Membership)
and external (vis-à-vis international civil society, broadly construed, for
21
22
example), with mixed results as far as democratic legitimation is concerned.
In this context, expressions of subsidiarity may be employed, not merely as
positive means of authority allocation, but rather as discursive devices for
managing and moderating the balance of authority and legitimacy between
different levels of governance. Crucially, this means that subsidiarity and
deference, ostensibly empowering subglobal decision-making authorities (such
as at the state level), may actually legitimate and strengthen global governance
levels. Indeed, even implicit, subsidiarity-like mechanics can contribute to the
legitimation of governance at the central (or higher) international level without

16. Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 7.
17. See id.
18. See generally Martti Koskeniemmi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 4
(1990) (providing a critical discussion of the tension between international law’s quest for normative
relevance and its subjection to political fiat).
19. See Simon Evenett, The Doha Round Impasse: A Graphical Account, 9 REV. INT’L ORG. 143,
144 (2014).
20. Examples of such institutional competition include the proliferation of Regional Trade
Agreements (RTAs) and the rise of “mega regionals” (the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership). See Thomas Cottier, The Common Law of International
Trade and the Future of the WTO, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 3 (2015).
21. See Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig & Sergio Puig, The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of the
WTO Appellate Body, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 254; Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Rule
of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO
Dispute Settlement, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 194–97 (2001).
22. See Samantha Besson, The Democratic Legitimacy of WTO Law—On the Dangers of Fast-food
Democracy, 22–26 (Nat’l Centres of Competence in Research, Working Paper No. 2011/72, 2011),
http://www.nccr-trade.org/publication/the-democratic-legitimacy-of-wto-law-on-the-dangers-of-fastfood-democracy/.
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23

detracting from its social power. These mechanics may even enhance the social
power of centralized international governance. The tables of subsidiarity can be
turned, therefore, with deference serving to empower central authority no less
than the constituent subunits, if not more so; but importantly, these exercises
have their limits, imposed by the ongoing relations between the entities
involved and the practical legitimacies they provide.
As already hinted, any descriptive and critical discussion of subsidiarity in
the WTO (as opposed to a more normative, indeed almost aspirational, study of
24
WTO waivers as an instrument of subsidiarity) must inevitably focus on the
organization’s dispute settlement system and its interpretation and application
of WTO law. If at the turn of the millennium many still thought that the chief
function of WTO dispute settlement was simply to manage EU–U.S. trade
relations—the traditional political economy of give-and-take market access—it
is now increasingly clear that its role, regardless of the identity of parties to
particular disputes, is to manage the balance between trade rules (whether in
the WTO or otherwise) on the one hand, and domestic regulatory space on the
other hand. This is closely connected to the substantive “[t]rade and . . .”
discourse, the debate regarding the proper role of the trade regime in
addressing nontrade values and interests—such as environmental sustainability,
public morals, or public health, as already mentioned—which has a horizontal
inter-regime dimension that can also be thought of, at least metaphorically, in
25
terms of subsidiarity. But it is much more clearly related to the allocation of
regulatory authority along the vertical axis, or spatial plane, of the competing
distribution of policy-making prowess between the WTO and national public
authorities, as well as regional organizations.
Although subsidiarity is not an enumerated principle of international (or
WTO) law, it arguably has many functional manifestations in the WTO. Indeed,
according to Pascal Lamy, the (European) former Director-General of the
WTO, subsidiarity is an essential principle of global governance as a normative
matter, and accordingly, “Policy should be allocated at the lowest level of
government (national, regional, or global) encompassing all benefits and
26
costs.” But given the absence of positive authority vested in the organization,
and the focus on dispute settlement, the subsidiarity conceived of in the WTO is
more similar to a loosely defined decision-making deference to national, or
possibly regional, preferences and laws.
23. “Power” here is used neither in a formal-legal sense, nor as empirical causation, STEVEN
LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (1974), but rather as a structural-realist concept involving “the
capacities to act possessed by social agents in virtue of the enduring relations in which they participate.”
Jeffrey C. Isaac, Beyond the Three Faces of Power: A Realist Critique, 20 POLITY 4, 22 (1987). For a
discussion of this kind of power in the judicial context, see BROUDE, supra note 14, at 46–47.
24. See generally Isabel Feichtner, Subsidiarity in the WTO: The Promise of Waivers, 79 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2016, at 75.
25. See Howse & Nicolaïdis, supra note 1.
26. Pascal Lamy, Speech at the Singapore Global Dialogue: Governance of a Multipolar World
Order (Sept. 21, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl248_e
.htm).
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With all of this in mind, this article examines, from positive and descriptive
perspectives, the actual extent of subsidiarity-like provisions and processes in
the WTO. In so doing, the article explores the nature and distribution of the
WTO’s operation. In a nutshell, the critical argument is that the (surprisingly
abundant) expressions of subsidiarity (or deference) in the WTO are selective
and strategic, not systemic, and that they more often than not serve to
counteract the anxieties of the multilateral decision-making machinery,
providing it with sources of enhanced legitimacy in its give-and-take with other
actors (the Membership in particular) over influence and governance.
Simultaneously, this selective subsidiarity does not clearly work to either
empower or disempower national (or regional) systems, and it is in this respect
that the deference becomes dialectical. This is how subsidiarity in action in the
WTO should be understood—not as a technical authority-allocation rule, but as
range of instruments and vocabularies through which the apportionment of
authority is negotiated and adjusted through the discursive device that
subsidiarity thus understood becomes.
Part II shows a small variety of elements of subsidiarity in the WTO’s
substantive norms. Some of these elements are interpretative in nature,
including the interpretation of particular terms in the WTO agreements; in
trade in goods and services; as well as in environmental, public health, public
27
morals, and security exceptions, while others are more allocative, such as the
construction of specific liberalization commitments in the WTO’s General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Part III demonstrates dialectic
dimensions of deference in some of the WTO’s procedural rules, which include
the “as such”/”as applied” complaint divide, the standard of review in dispute
settlement, the choice of means of compliance following dispute settlement, and
the relationship with trade agreements outside the WTO (all as discussed in this
part). Part IV concludes with thoughts on the dualities of subsidiarity in
international governance.
II
SEEKING SUBSIDIARITY IN THE WTO’S SUBSTANTIVE NORMS
Subsidiarity and deference have numerous expressions in the substantive
law of the WTO. The following is just a sketch of some of these, which
demonstrates these expressions can (and do) also work to strengthen and
empower the supposedly higher or central WTO domain, rather than Members’
decisionmaking, contrary to the conventional logic of subsidiarity. The focus is
largely on the interpretation as well as on the creation of some of the rules that
regulate the interface between trade liberalization and domestic regulatory
autonomy, and elements of this counterintuitive dynamic can be detected in
28
other significant areas of WTO law as well.
27. For the distinction between interpretative and allocative subsidiarity, see Jachtenfuchs &
Krisch, supra note 2, at 10, 20–21.
28. For examples of this dynamic, see Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade, Jan. 1, 1995,
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In passing, the interchangeability of subsidiarity and deference is not selfevident. Subsidiarity, strictly speaking, may be understood as a rule (however
fuzzy) that governs the allocation of authority, with a preference for the local or
lower levels of decisionmaking. In contrast, deference is a voluntary yet
29
respectful submission to the authority of the other. In many respects, the
implicit subsidiarity referred to here has much in common with deference in the
softer normative sense, as it derives from (and forms) the enduring relations
between actors, and as already noted, is not based on a reasoned or structured
norm. Having noted that, for the purposes of this article the two terms are
treated as mutually substitutable.
A. The Interpretative Structure of GATT and GATS General Exceptions
The all-important Article XX GATT (and its services corollary, Article XIV
GATS)—the general exceptions clause—acts as a central axis in managing the
balance between WTO trade rules and domestic regulatory space, as well as in
determining the degree of deference accorded to WTO Members’ assessments
of their own regulatory needs in a broad range of public policy areas, such as
the protection of public morals; human, animal, or plant life or health; and the
30
conservation of exhaustible natural resources. The text of Article XX GATT
has provided fertile ground for intricate, and at times controversial,
hermeneutical discussions between Members and between them and the dispute
settlement system. These include, perhaps most saliently, the interpretation of
the term “necessary to” that appears in several of the subclauses of the
31
provision. This is the so-called “necessity test,” which contrasts with the use of
the term “related to” present in the other subclauses of Article XX GATT.
When is a measure necessary to protect human health or public morals? As
interpreted in WTO jurisprudence, this question has certainly evolved into an
instrument of subsidiarity.
32
The classic EC–Asbestos dispute is instructive in this respect. Canada
complained against an absolute ban applied by France with respect to all
1868 U.N.T.S. 120, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, Jan. 1, 1995, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, and
to a lesser extent, TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S.
299.
29. See generally PHILIP SOPER, THE ETHICS OF DEFERENCE: LEARNING FROM LAW’S MORALS
(2002) (developing a theory of law based on a moral duty to defer, as distinguished from a duty to obey
or to conform).
30. The general exceptions in Article XX GATT constitute an exhaustive list of public-policy
justifications for divergence from GATT obligations. See FEDERICO ORTINO, BASIC LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS FOR THE LIBERALISATION OF TRADE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EC AND WTO
LAW 120 (2004).
31. See Andrew Mitchell & Caroline Henckels, Variations on a Theme: Comparing the Concept of
“Necessity” in International Investment Law and WTO Law, 14 CHI. J. INT’L L. 93, 123–29 (2013).
32. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos Containing Products, ¶¶ 164–175, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001). This,
and other cases discussed in this article, while not recent, reflect the dilemmas of deference that have
not changed significantly.
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asbestos products due to their carcinogenic qualities. Canada argued, among
other things, that the “level of protection” sought by France was questionable,
and that there were reasonably available, less trade-restrictive measures for
33
achieving adequate protection from asbestos-related risks. In its Report (in
essence, a judicial decision—the WTO dispute settlement system is more than
functionally an international tribunal), the AB stated in no uncertain terms that
“it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right to determine the level of
34
protection of health that they consider appropriate in a given situation,” and
that “France could not reasonably be expected to employ any alternative
measure if that measure would involve a continuation of the very risk that the
35
Decree seeks to ‘halt.’”
Surely, both legs of this decision reflect a highly deferential approach. In
subsidiarity terms, this is an interpretation that leaves to the supposedly lower
(that is, WTO Member) decision-making authority the power to determine the
36
appropriate level of protection accorded to the public policy concern that is a
justification for WTO inconsistency—which in turn serves as a central factor for
assessing the reasonableness of purportedly alternative measures. As far as the
examination of specific public policy exceptions is concerned, the WTO dispute
settlement system has proved extremely deferential to Members invoking them,
in two cases even accepting China’s censorship system as supporting public
37
morals, without question. The very definition of public morals—as adopted by
38
the AB in U.S.–Gambling, in which U.S. restrictions on Internet gambling
services were challenged by the small Caribbean island state of Antigua and
39
Barbuda, and recently confirmed in EC–Seals, in which EU prohibitions on
the sale of products derived from seal hunting, which involves great suffering to
the hunted animals, were at issue—is highly deferential, avoiding the
establishment of some kind of central or higher image of morality. The AB has

33. Id. ¶ 165.
34. Id. ¶ 168.
35. Id. ¶ 174.
36. Similar expressions appear more explicitly in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and
Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade. “Appropriate Level of Protection” is more properly a
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures term, clearly envisioned as being determined by the Member. See
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, pmbl., art. 4.1, Apr. 4, 1994. This is echoed by the
Sixth Preambular Recital Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade: “[N]o country should be
prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of
human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices,
at the levels it considers appropriate” (emphasis added). See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
pmbl., art. 6, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120.
37. See Tomer Broude & Holger P. Hestermeyer, The First Condition of Progress? Freedom of
Speech and the Limits of International Trade Law, VA. J. INT’L L. 295, 314–17 (2014).
38. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (adopted Nov. 10, 2004); Appellate Body Report, United
States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 296, WTO
Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2005).
39. LOVELL, supra note 13.

3-BROUDE INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2016]

SELECTIVE SUBSIDIARITY AND DIALECTIC DEFERENCE

5/22/2016 1:26 PM

61

determined that “the term ‘public morals’ denotes standards of right and wrong
40
conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.”
This is hardly, however, the end of the story. Deference to the public policy
goal as assessed by the respondent Member does not automatically mean that
its measure will be justified by the relevant exception and accepted by the
dispute settlement system. There are other obstacles to be surmounted, in
particular the terms of the celebrated chapeau of Article XX GATT (emulated
41
in Article XIV GATS). The chapeau subjects any claim of exceptionality to
requirements of an absence of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination” or a
“disguised restriction on international trade.” The record shows that these
elements of the chapeau are an extremely difficult hurdle to jump—out of a few
dozen disputes in which general exceptions have been invoked, only one or two
(depending on one’s reading) have traversed the chapeau successfully. This is an
empiric that has even recently been seized upon by opponents of new
international trade agreements (such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership), as a
demonstration of the lack of deference in the WTO and trade law more
42
generally.
Subsidiarity and deference may therefore be, in practice, significantly
curtailed by the strictness of the chapeau. The hand that defers—by recognizing
the Members’ right to regulate and their autonomy to determine appropriate
goals of protection—easily taketh away by finding some otherwise unjustifiable
flaw in the measure at issue. Indeed, this might even be perceived as faux
deference to the extent that the negative power to strike down national
measures is retained and unflinchingly employed by the higher WTO dispute
settlement authority. The public policy consideration is accepted as vital—
public morals in U.S.–Gambling and U.S.–Seals, public health in other cases—
but the method of implementation is still subject to review, and it almost always
fails.
However, a more careful reading of the cases reveals the full dialectic of
subsidiarity. The reasons why a measure does not satisfy the terms of the
chapeau do not negate the underlying deference to the justification of the
measure, and they are usually not so difficult to subsequently rectify through a
process of trial, error, and inter-institutional negotiation. This is why in EC–
Seals, as but one example, the EU celebrated the AB’s recognition of animal
welfare as justifiable under the public-morals exception in Article XX(a)

40. Appellate Body Report, US—Gambling, ¶¶ 296–298; Panel Report, US—Gambling, ¶ 6.46
(emphasis added).
41. For a recent, incisive analysis, see generally Lorand Bartels, The Chapeau of the General
Exceptions in the GATT and GATS Agreements: A Reconstruction, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 95 (2015)
(meticulously examining each element of the chapeau).
42. See, e.g., Only One of 40 Attempts to Use the GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV “General
Exception” Has Ever Succeeded: Replicating the WTO Exception Construct Will Not Provide for an
Effective TPP General Exception, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Aug. 2015), https://www.citizen.org/documents/
general-exception.pdf (providing evidence of the ineffectiveness of the GATT Article XX and GATS
Article XIV).
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GATT, even though its measure had failed the chapeau test. The faults the AB
found in the measure could be cured “with some modifications that would
43
amount to gestures of good faith,” as some commentators have noted. The
same could be said about many of the other cases in which the chapeau
requirements have not been satisfied. Has subsidiarity not been reinstated,
then?
Rather than drawing a bright line—or at least reasoned and structured
degrees of deference—this discussion demonstrates that subsidiarity and
deference are far from binary concepts. Through Article XX, the WTO defers
to lower-level decisions, and then finds fault in them, but the flaws are rarely
fatal. Who, then, does subsidiarity empower? Arguably, it empowers both the
higher and lower actors. As a result, the regulatory space of states is only
minimally restricted, but in the process, this space is subjected to the overruling
power of WTO dispute settlement scrutiny.
This dialectic structure is not accidental, but it is rather the offshoot of
deliberate interpretative choices made by the AB. For example, in the
formative years of its influence and legitimation, particularly in the seminal
44
U.S.–Shrimp case, the WTO AB addressed the seemingly formalistic question
of how to sequence the analysis of a national measure’s conformity with the
Article XX GATT chapeau and the enumerated categories of issue-area
exceptions. Should the national measure under review first be evaluated under
the general terms of the chapeau, and only then be assessed in relation to one of
the explicitly enumerated public-policy justifications, or vice versa? The U.S.–
Shrimp Panel considered the U.S. environmental measure first under the
45
chapeau, in effect striking the entire measure down in the abstract,
emphasizing its trade impact, without looking into the substantive applications
46
of the measure relating to animal life and exhaustible natural resources. This
approach left little scope for recognition of national, subsidiary concerns. The
AB, in contrast, found the Panel to be in error, reversing the sequence of
47
analysis. The measure should first be judged by whether it conforms to one of
the enumerated exceptions, and only then be assessed under the chapeau terms.

43. See Robert Howse, Joanna Langille & Katie Sykes, Sealing the Deal: The WTO’s Appellate
Body Report in EC–Seal Products, 18 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (June 4, 2014),
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/12/sealing-deal-wto%E2%80%99s-appellate-body-reportec-%E2%80%93-seal-products. Indeed, commentators posit that the AB approach to public morals is
appropriately deferential to the pluralism of WTO Members’ public morals. See Robert Howse, Joanna
Langille & Katie Sykes, Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the WTO After Seal
Products, GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 2, 66–68 (2015).
44. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶¶ 125–186, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998).
45. Panel Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶
7.29, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/R (adopted May 15, 1998).
46. Id. ¶ 7.63.
47. Appellate Body Report, US—Shrimp, ¶ 117.

3-BROUDE INCORPORATED (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2016]

SELECTIVE SUBSIDIARITY AND DIALECTIC DEFERENCE

5/22/2016 1:26 PM

63

This order of analysis has hardly been questioned since the AB’s
48
49
determination. It has been adopted in the GATS as well, and can therefore
be taken as a (technical) canon of WTO law. Importantly, it is this
interpretative move that has allowed the WTO dispute settlement system, when
faced with Article XX GATT (and similar) arguments, to project deference by
embracing the policy goals of Members, subject to the strict terms of the
chapeau, while simultaneously leaving sufficient room to maneuver among the
technicalities of removing the causes of “arbitrary or unjustifiable
50
discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on international trade.” This effect
both increases the legitimacy of the WTO and its dispute settlement system
without visibly detracting from its powerful oversight and influence, and
provides Members with adequate, negotiated policy space.
In other words, subsidiarity and deference have served the higher level of
decisionmaking no less, if not more, than the lower levels, by staking out a field
of deliberation and negotiation whose ground rules are established by the WTO
dispute settlement system, but require the satisfaction of the participating
Members—therefore granting them in practice greater autonomy than the eye
might see at first. To be sure, this discussion of Article XX GATT is merely one
dimension in a much wider scheme of interpretative balancing between WTO
trade rules and dispute settlement authority on the one hand, and Members’
regulatory autonomy on the other. Similar dilemmas and interpretative
decisions have been manifested in the Agreements on Technical Barriers to
Trade (such as the “legitimate regulatory distinction” issue) and the Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (such as the “appropriate level of protection,” and
51
deference to scientific risk assessments conducted by a Member). Although it
is not possible to address meaningfully these additional dimensions here, they
all present a similar pattern of dialectic deference that enhances the WTO’s
centrality while acknowledging states’ decision-making authorities.
B. The Strange Case of Security Exceptions
An interesting outlier in comparison with the general Article XX GATT and
Article XIV GATS exceptions discussed above, but nevertheless an example of
selective—and negotiated rather than reasoned—subsidiarity and dialectic
deference, are the security exceptions under Article XXI GATT and Article
XIV bis GATS. According to these provisions, exceptions to trade rules can be
made regarding several prescribed security-related circumstances. Thus, a
Member may refrain from disclosing information it considers to be contrary to
its essential security interests; a Member is not prevented by the agreements

48. But see Bartels, supra note 41 (raising arguments in favor of a contrary order of analysis).
49. As in the first case in which Article XIV GATS was invoked. See Panel Report, US—
Gambling, ¶¶ 6.438–7.5.
50. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Art. XX, Apr. 15, 1994.
51. See Michael Ming Du, The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GATT/WTO Regime,
14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 639, 651–52 (2011).
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from taking action it considers necessary for the protection of its essential
security interests (relating to fissionable material, traffic in arms, ammunition
and implements of war, or more generally, in time of war or other emergency in
international relations); and a Member is not prevented by trade obligations
from taking any action in pursuance of its “obligations under the United
Nations Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.”
These broad exceptions have in practice become—at least so far—
significantly deferential. In a 1949 dispute regarding Cold War export
restrictions imposed by the United States vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia, a majority of
involved GATT Contracting Parties unsurprisingly supported the U.S. position
52
that the measures were justified for national-security reasons. The very
subjection of the security consideration to higher scrutiny may suggest a lack of
deference, but the decision itself was clearly entirely political and, consequently,
highly deferential. Subsequently—almost forty years later, and after very few
invocations of the exception—a 1986 GATT Panel, called to adjudicate a late
Cold War dispute between the United States and Nicaragua, rejected U.S.
claims that the applicability of the security exception is at the exclusive
discretion of parties, by the logic that
[i]f it were accepted that the interpretation of Article XXI was reserved entirely to the
contracting party invoking it, how could the CONTRACTING PARTIES ensure that
this general exception to all obligations under the General Agreement is not invoked
53
excessively or for purposes other than those set out in this provision?

Under the procedural rules that applied in the old GATT system, this Panel
Report was essentially vetoed by the United States, and not adopted. Ever since
then, security exceptions have de facto, though not de jure, been considered,
especially by the United States, to be “self-judging,” essentially—under this
interpretation, which is not without controversy—a full-blown form of
54
deference and subsidiarity. But at the same time, this hardly tells us much, as
Members have by and large displayed hesitation, if not absolute reluctance, in
either lodging complaints that may involve security concerns or invoking them
as justifications for WTO-inconsistent measures. As one commentator has
noted, “[I]n over sixty years of international trade, invocations of the security
exception have only been challenged a handful of times, and those challenges
55
have never resulted in a binding GATT/WTO decision.” Of course, Panels and
the AB cannot discuss security exceptions sua sponte (of their own accord), and

52. See Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting (June 8, 1949), GATT BISD CP.3/SR22 II/28.
53. Report of the Panel, United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶ 5.17 GATT Doc.
L/6053 (not adopted Oct. 13, 1986).
54. For a more complete, yet noncritical, account of the practice of security exceptions generally
endorsing the (quite exclusively) U.S. position on this matter, see generally Roger Paul Alford, The
Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 3 UTAH L. REV. 697 (2011). See also Dapo Akande & Sope
Williams, International Adjudication on National Security Issues: What Role for the WTO?, 43 VA. J.
INT’L L. 365 (2003).
55. Alford, supra note 54, at 699.
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so this would appear to have in practice removed security issues entirely from
the ambit of the WTO.
Another view, however, is that WTO Members are well aware, and wary, of
the (now, but not permanently, latent) power wielded, however cautiously, by a
WTO dispute settlement system. This power cannot be vetoed if the selfproclaimed “self-judging” nature of security exceptions were actually tried and
tested (perhaps overturned and refuted) by the central judicial authority of the
WTO. This is, therefore, not real subsidiarity or deference, but rather a
normative no-man’s-land, to be left for future judicial negotiation, and it is only
a matter of time until the security exceptions enter the WTO jurisprudential
field again. As the Membership of the WTO approaches universality, and new
56
conflicts emerge (such as between Russia and Ukraine), the continuation of
57
the traditionally depoliticized nature of the WTO cannot be taken for granted.
The point here is that the actual reach of subsidiarity depends on the continued
practice of both the higher and lower actors on a vertical plane, rather than on a
clearly defined line of authority allocation.
C. The Design Architecture of Specific Commitments in the GATS
As another example of dialectic deference in substantive issues, even more
relevant to the negotiation and creation of commitments than merely to their
interpretation, consider the concept of GATS-specific commitments, in
particular the negotiation modality of “positive listing.” The potentially
consequential services trade liberalization commitments of Market Access
(Article XVI GATS) and National Treatment (Article XVII GATS), as well as
elements of Domestic Regulation disciplines (Article VI GATS), apply only in
those sectors (for example, financial services, accounting services, and
telecommunications services) in which a Member has assumed such obligations
through explicit enumeration in its schedule of commitments, and subject to
58
whatever limitations listed. This should not be reduced merely to an
expression of consent to be bound as a general matter, but should rather be
understood as an important manifestation of functional subsidiarity in the
design architecture of a central substantive pillar of the WTO.
In the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations on trade in services, parties were
not required to liberalize services across the board; instead, they were given the
greater flexibility to opt in to liberalization in sectors of their choice, subject, of

56. See Elena Klonitskaya, Is the WTO the Right Forum to Hear National Security Issues?, 9
GLOBAL TRADE CUSTOMS J. 508, 508–11 (2014).
57. See Arie Reich, The Threat of Politicization of the WTO, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 779, 788–
98 (2005).
58. For analyses of “negative/positive” listings in services, see Tomer Broude & Shai Moses, The
Behavioral Dynamics of Positive and Negative Listing in Services Trade Liberalization: A Look at the
Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Negotiations, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRADE IN SERVICES
(forthcoming 2016); Rudolf Adlung & Hamid Mamdouh, How to Design Trade Agreements in Services:
Top Down or Bottom Up? 1–18 (WTO Staff Working Paper, No. ERSD-2013-08, 2013), http://hdl.
handle.net/10419/80065.
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course, to negotiations and the mutual acceptability of these “concessions”
among the parties. Accordingly, in sectors and modes of supply that were (and
still are) politically sensitive in the domestic sphere—and hence worthy of such
deference—states have chosen to refrain from liberalization. They accordingly
retained their unfettered right to exclude foreign service providers or to
discriminate against them, although still subject to a set of general
commitments, such as Most-Favored Nation treatment and transparency. Thus,
for example, the vast majority of Members have not undertaken commitments
under Mode 4, relating to the temporary movement of natural persons (that is,
services provision through labor migration), nor, in any mode of supply, with
59
respect to health and social services.
The positive listing of specific commitments therefore leaves the decision to
liberalize at a (negotiated) sub-WTO national decision-making level. Hence it is
referred to, sometimes, as a bottom-up approach, and ostensibly provides WTO
Members with significant precommitment policy space similar to subsidiarity.
The choice of services sectors in which a Member would be willing to liberalize
has been left to that Member rather than made in a centralized, top-down,
manner, although the Member remains subject to political negotiation pressures
from other Members. In theory, Members could choose to expand their specific
commitments to other sectors after the conclusion of GATS negotiations,
although this has rarely happened, and the perpetuation of the positive, list60
specific commitment approach in the Doha Round has not proved successful.
There is a flipside, however, to this structural subsidiarity. Once a specific
commitment has been made, WTO practice and jurisprudence can take it very
seriously, ultimately seizing full, albeit deliberative and negotiated, control over
its interpretation and enforcement. The rigidity of specific commitments is built
in; under Article XXI GATS, a Member may not modify or withdraw a specific
commitment without compensatory adjustments vis-à-vis affected Members,
based on either negotiation or arbitration.
The most salient case in point is the U.S.–Gambling dispute discussed above
61
in the context of the public morals exception. In that case, regarding the claim
that it was in violation of its obligations, the United States emphatically denied
that it had made specific market-access commitments relating to remote
gambling services. In doing so, however, the United States employed the rules
62
of interpretation of international law in general and the WTO in particular,
essentially surrendering its claim to the interpretative discretion of the WTO
dispute adjudicators.

59. See Rudolf Adlung, The GATS Negotiations: Implications for Health and Social Services, 38
INTERECONOMICS 147, 147–49 (2003).
60. In regional and plurilateral agreements, more elaborate listing approaches have been pursued.
See Broude & Moses, supra note 58, at 17.
61. Panel Report, US—Gambling.
62. Id. ¶¶ 3.40–.47.
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A different approach, only barely detectable in the arguments, would have
been to claim that the WTO should defer, at least to some extent, to a
Member’s own understanding of its schedule of commitments. Both the Panel
and the AB address this proposed window of subsidiarity negatively. Relying on
earlier jurisprudence relating to the interpretation of GATT tariff schedules,
the Panel inferred that the GATS schedules of commitments reflect the
“common intention” of WTO Members, and that their meaning cannot be made
“dependant [sic] on the subjective and unilateral interpretation of the United
63
States.” In its discussion, the AB seemed to take this objectivity almost for
64
granted. Subsequently, both the Panel and the AB, although for different
interpretative reasons, were not persuaded by the U.S. argument for greater
respect for subjective understandings of what a Member had intended to
become obligated to, finding instead that a commitment had indeed been
65
made, with all the normative weight according to it under the rules of the
GATS game. Thus, even in the creation of commitments, subsidiarity may
reign, but not supreme—by analogy to the “touch-move” rule in chess, decisionmaking autonomy can disintegrate very quickly once a decision appears to have
been made.
This element of U.S.–Gambling can surely be understood as constituting a
negative incentive to future liberalization, and in this sense, perhaps has
weakened the ability of the WTO to generate new specific commitments, but
that is not our concern here. Rather, the point is that the formal subsidiarity of
the precommitment decision to liberalize has not translated into
postcommitment deference regarding the interpretation of the scope of the
commitment.
III
WTO PROCEDURAL AND INTERPRETATIVE RULES AS REFLECTIONS OF
SUBSIDIARITY
A dialectic of deference—in the sense that subsidiarity exists, but as a
negotiated tension between Members’ preferences and central WTO trends that
are sometimes empowered by it—can also be detected in interpretative choices
made by the WTO dispute settlement system in a range of procedural and
interpretative scenarios. These seemingly technical and formal issues are
actually important switches in the management of subsidiarity and deference, as
well as in crafting a balance between trade liberalization and domestic
regulatory autonomy. Their use in the production and justification of outcomes
imparts significant effects both on the legitimacy of substantive decisions, and
on the relative power of the high and low levels of decisionmaking, keeping in
mind that “substance and procedure must be distinguished to make analytical
63. Id. ¶ 4.9.
64. Appellate Body Report, US—Gambling, ¶ 159.
65. See Federico Ortino, Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in United
States—Gambling: A Critique, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 117, 119 (2006).
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and normative sense, but at the same time they must be seen in conjunction to
66
understand the protection of global public goods in international law.” The
following is a series of necessarily perfunctory expositions of three of these
interpretative and procedural questions.
A. The “As Such”/“As Applied” and “Mandatory/Discretionary” Distinctions
67

GATT and WTO jurisprudence have for more than a quarter of a century
grappled with the treatment of domestic (that is, national) legislation that as
stated on the books may contain inconsistencies with WTO obligations. These
inconsistencies, considered violations “as such,” are distinct from specific and
68
concrete instances of breach, which are known as “as applied” violations.
Subsidiarity would suggest that a Member is free to adopt laws granting its
executive and administrative agencies as much freedom as it sees fit, so long as
69
they do not take actual actions that violate WTO commitments. Such an
approach would have the effect of excluding entirely “as such” claims from the
ambit of WTO dispute settlement. There may be, however, good reasons to
allow “as such” claims, detached from specific violations (or semi-detached).
“As such” challenges may include cases in which a Member challenges a
70
consistently continued practice of another Member, such as the chilling effect
of a potentially trade-restrictive statute even if it is not applied, or the
cumulative litigation costs of challenging repeated specific measures (including
evidentiary costs) instead of the statutory root cause of the violation. “As such”
71
claims are therefore indisputably allowed in the WTO. However, for
deferential reasons, these claims are considered “serious challenges” and
require a higher standard of proof in comparison to claims of actual violation
72
“as applied.” This seems to show a more generous level of respect to states’

66. André Nollkaemper, International Adjudication of Global Public Goods: The Intersection of
Substance and Procedure, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 769, 791 (2012).
67. Evidence from this grappling stems from the 1988 Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act dispute. See Panel Report, United States—Taxes on Petroleum and Related
Substances, ¶ 5.1.1 WTO Doc. L/6175–34S/136 (adopted June 17, 1987). For one review of the case and
subsequent development, see Alan O. Sykes, An Economic Perspective on As Such/Facial versus As
Applied Challenges in the WTO and U.S. Constitutional Systems, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 4–10 (2014).
68. These distinctions have garnered considerable scholarly interest. See Simon Lester, A
Framework for Thinking about the ‘Discretion’ in the Mandatory/Discretionary Distinction, 14 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 369, 372 (2011).
69. “As such” claims have been called a “deference tool.” See Jing Kang, The Presumption of
Good Faith in the WTO ‘As Such’ Cases: A Reformulation of the Mandatory/Discretionary Distinction
as an Analytical Tool, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 879, 880 (2012).
70. See Panel Report, United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing
Methodology, ¶ 2.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS350/R (adopted Feb. 19, 2009) (disputing the continued
application by the United States of anti-dumping duties), as modified by AB Report WT/DS350/AB/R.
71. Appellate Body Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, ¶ 60, WTO Doc.
WT/DS136/AB/R (adopted Aug. 28, 2000) (recognizing that Members may “challenge legislation as
such, independently from the application of that legislation in specific instances”).
72. Appellate Body Report, United States—Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Measures on Oil
Country Tubular Goods from Argentina, ¶ 172, WTO Doc. WT/DS268/AB/R (adopted Nov. 29, 2004).
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policy space, but at the same time leaves a high degree of discretion to WTO
adjudicators, with plenty of room for strategic selectiveness.
“As such” claims can reach the peak of potential intrusiveness in special
cases when they target national legislation that does not mandate action that
violates WTO obligations (even in particular circumstances) but nevertheless
somehow grants administrative agencies the (domestic) power to infringe upon
WTO rules at their discretion—the so-called “mandatory/discretionary”
73
distinction. The old GATT approach avoided scrutiny of discretionary
74
legislation, but an important (not appealed) WTO Panel Report brilliantly
75
unpacked this as an analytical fallacy, demonstrating that discretionary
legislation might in itself be a violation of WTO rules. This stricter, more
76
nuanced approach has largely been adopted by the AB.
Thus, although a semblance of subsidiarity is maintained by the “as
such”/”as applied” and “mandatory/discretionary” distinctions, the powers of
judicial review have been bolstered. Indeed, the U.S.–Section 301 Panel found
that potential for a statutory authorization to breach WTO obligations was a
violation in itself, saved only by a valid executive commitment (a U.S.
77
“Statement of Administrative Action”) to refrain from committing violations.
This exemplifies dialectic deference: speaking the language of subsidiarity—so
long as the WTO line is toed—all the while wielding the stick of supremacy.
B. The Standard of Review in WTO Law
The standard of review—the depth and intensity of scrutiny applied by the
dispute settlement system to national measures—is a central procedural
mechanism for regulating subsidiarity in the WTO, as a normative valve that
78
distinguishes between central and domestic regulatory autonomy. The term
“standard of review” does not actually appear in the WTO agreements, instead
evolving jurisprudentially, yet it has been referred to as “a deliberate allocation
of vertical power between WTO adjudicating bodies and national authorities to
79
decide upon factual and legal issues,” and it may therefore be thought of as
73. See Nicolas Lockhart & Elizabeth Sheargold, In Search of Relevant Discretion: The Role of the
Mandatory/Discretionary Distinction in WTO Law, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 379, 380 (2010).
74. See Report of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and
Use of Tobacco, ¶ 118, BISD 41S/131 (Oct. 4, 1994).
75. See Panel Report, WT/DS152/R, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974, ¶ 7.97
n. 675, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (adopted Jan. 25, 2000) (“It could not be presumed, in our view, that
the WTO would never prohibit legislation under which a national administration would enjoy certain
discretionary powers.”).
76. See Appellate Body Report, United States–Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on
Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, ¶ 88, WTO Doc. WT/DS244/AB/R
(adopted Jan. 9, 2004).
77. See Appellate Body Report, US—Sections 301–310, ¶¶ 7.109–.126.
78. For an early exploration, see generally Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute
Procedures Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193 (1996)
(analyzing the standard of review in regard to the Anti-Dumping Agreement in Article 17.6 of the
Uruguay Round texts).
79. Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 635, 635
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similar to other judicial forms of deference, such as the margin of appreciation.
However, beyond the very constrained and specific terms of Article 17.6 of the
81
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, the formulation of the general standard
under which WTO Panels and the AB review national decisions in relation to
82
WTO rules has proven elusive. Recourse is normally made to Article 11 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), whereby “a panel should make an
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment
of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant
83
covered agreements . . . ,” but the vagueness of this clause provides only a
vestige of systematicity. The jurisprudence has not endeavored to establish clear
criteria for reviewing national measures, to the point that the adjudicators can
seemingly choose when and to what extent to intervene. In practice,
comprehensive analysis has shown that the standard of review tends to be quite
84
intrusive, at times even amounting to de novo review of national decisions and
determinations. The AB has not hesitated to reproach Panels when in its view
85
they proved too deferential to national authorities.
The standard of review, therefore, although seemingly a legal mechanism
for structuring subsidiarity and deference that in principle should empower
lower decision-making levels, is rather a very fuzzy concept in which allocations
of authority can be negotiated in a judicial environment that actually leaves the
86
final word to the central or higher level of WTO adjudicators.
(2003).
80. See generally Andreas Føllesdal, Subsidiarity and International Human-Rights Courts:
Respecting Self-Governance and Protecting Human Rights—or Neither?, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 2, 2016, at 147 (referring to the margin of appreciation in international human-rights tribunals as
subsidiarity); DEFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND MARGIN OF APPRECIATION (Lukasz Gruszynski & Wouter Werner eds., 2014) (examining
margin of appreciation in various international law contexts); Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin
of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2006) (evaluating the margin
of appreciation doctrine in recent International Court of Justice decisions).
81. This provision is the only premeditated standard of review in the WTO, with very limited
reach. The AB has held that it is irrelevant beyond anti-dumping, even with respect to closely related
countervailing duty determinations. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Imposition of
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in
the United Kingdom, ¶ 49, WTO Doc. WTO/DS138/R (May 10, 2000).
82. See ROSS BECROFT, THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: CRITIQUE
AND DEVELOPMENT (Edward Elgar ed., 2012).
83. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 11, Apr.
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401
[hereinafter DSU].
84. See Oesch, supra note 79. But see Michael Ioannidis, Beyond the Standard of Review:
Deference Criteria in WTO Law and the Case for a Procedural Approach, in DEFERENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 80, at 91.
85. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Investigation of the International Trade
Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, ¶ 130,
WTO Doc. WT/DS277/AB/RW (adopted Apr. 13, 2006).
86. The burden of proof is another procedural vehicle of selective subsidiarity. In the WTO it has
vacillated in different directions, selectively serving the legitimation ends of particular cases. This has
hinged on the technical—and logically faulted—classification of a claim as a rule or an exception. See
Tomer Broude, Genetically Modified Rules: The Awkward Rule-Exception-Right Distinction in EC—
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C. The Flexibility toward WTO Members’ Choice of Compliance Measures
Yet another procedural expression of subsidiarity in the WTO is the way in
which the DSU relates to the range of steps a Member may take in situations
where its measures have been found by a Panel or the AB, or both, to be WTOinconsistent. Under Article 19.1 of the DSU Panels and the AB shall (merely)
recommend that a Member bring its measure “into conformity,” and may
87
“suggest ways” to do so. In practice, such substantive suggestions are rarely
88
made, and adjudicators avoid making them even when requested to do so
89
explicitly by a complainant. Moreover, even when suggestions are made, the
90
Member is not duty-bound to pursue them. In short, the WTO dispute
settlement does not dictate to Members precisely which means to take in order
to secure compliance. This would appear to leave a lot of policy space—the
discretion to choose the modality of compliance—to Members, as an expression
of deference or subsidiarity. Of course, actual measures taken to comply may be
subject to renewed review if they are challenged under Article 21.5 compliance
91
panel procedures. When that occurs, the benchmark for adjudication is
compliance with the WTO Covered Agreements, not with the conclusions of
92
the original Panel/AB proceedings, even if suggestions were made.
Having said that, this deference is far from absolute, and the dispute
settlement system has developed means of effectively signaling to Members
which methods of compliance would be acceptable. Most noticeably—although
subtly so—the AB in particular has proven adept at crafting its legal analysis in
ways that indicate to the infringing Member what would be required in
93
amended legislation for a measure to survive subsequent scrutiny. Thus, one
might argue that true deference is essentially obviated, and in any case, no clear
and reasoned standards of subsidiarity are affected. As a result, the power of
the dispute settlement system to influence and indeed quash measures taken to
comply is upheld. The middle ground, however, is that the choice of compliance
measures is yet another field of dialectic deference and negotiated subsidiarity
discourse between the WTO and its Members, in which a delicate balance is
maintained—but with significant weight pulled by the dispute settlement system
in the direction of its powers.
Biotech, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 215, 215 (2007).
87. DSU art. 19.4.
88. See Julien Chaisse, Deconstructing the WTO Conformity Obligation: A Theory of Compliance
as Process, 38 FORDHAM J. INT’L L. 57, 94 (2015).
89. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Zeroing, ¶¶ 384–394 (“[A]s the
right to make a suggestion is discretionary, a panel declining a request for such a suggestion does not
act contrary to . . . the DSU.”).
90. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Ecuador, ¶¶ 321–325, WTO
Doc. WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU (adopted Dec. 11, 2008).
91. DSU art. 21.5.
92. Appellate Body Report, EC—Bananas.
93. As seen in Appellate Body Report, US—Shrimp; and discernable in the AB’s reasoning in the
Appellate Body Report, EC—Seals, at ¶¶ 5.316–.339.
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One particularly illuminating example of this can be found in the seemingly
esoteric arbitrations under Article 21.3(c) of the DSU on the “reasonable
94
period of time” for compliance. Arbitrators in these cases customarily take
great pains to emphasize that their role is solely to establish the reasonable time
under the particular circumstances, and not to determine the preferred method
95
of compliance. However, in reality, the two questions are so intertwined that
beyond stating that the implementing Member has “a measure of discretion in
96
choosing the means of implementation that it deems most appropriate,” it is
practically impossible to consider the formal issue of the implementation period
97
without delving into the proposed methods of compliance.
D. WTO Dispute Settlement and Its Interaction with Regional Trade
Agreements
As a final, brief example of how subsidiarity can be selectively and indeed
strategically (dis)employed as a discursive device, consider the WTO dispute
settlement system’s current deliberately oblivious approach to the law and
procedures of regional trade arrangements. There exist today hundreds of such
agreements, the laws of which often correspond with WTO rules, necessarily
98
creating instances of substantive and procedural overlap. If regional trade
arrangements set out particular rules and procedures (generally acceptable
99
under WTO law), a vertical subsidiarity-oriented approach would have
suggested (for reasons of both legitimacy and efficiency) an enhanced deference
100
thereto. Yet in several disputes, WTO Panels and the AB have demonstrated
101
a clear unwillingness to even take regional rules and decisions into account.

94. See Werner Zdouc, The Reasonable Period of Time for Compliance with the Rulings and
Recommendations adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, in KEY ISSUES IN WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 94 (Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson eds., 2005).
95. See Award of the Arbitrator, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL)
Requirements, ¶ 68, WTO Doc. WT/DS384/24, WT/DS386/23 (Dec. 4, 2012) (“[My] mandate relates to
the time by when the implementing Member must achieve compliance, not to the manner in which that
Member achieves compliance.”).
96. See Award of the Arbitrator, China—Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain
Oriented Flat-rolled Electrical Steel from the United States, ¶ 3.4, WTO Doc. WT/DS414/12 (May 3,
2013).
97. Id. ¶ 3.2 (“[T]he means of implementation available to the Member concerned is a relevant
consideration.”).
98. See Gabrielle Marceau & Julian Wyatt, Dispute Settlement Regimes Intermingled: Regional
Trade Agreements and the WTO, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 67, 68–73 (2010).
99. See Petros C. Mavroidis, Always Look at the Bright Side of Non-Delivery: WTO and
Preferential Trade Agreements, Yesterday and Today, 10 WORLD TRADE REV. 375, 377 (2011)
(discussing Article XXIV GATT and related instruments such as the “transparency mechanism”).
100. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO
Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 3, 2007); Appellate Body Report, European Communities—
Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS69/AB/R (adopted
July 13, 1998).
101. Especially illuminating is the Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Soft Drinks, ¶ 56 (the AB’s
unwillingness to undertake “a determination whether the United States has acted consistently or
inconsistently with its NAFTA obligations” reflects its concern over integrating authority); see also
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Strong rationales certainly exist for eschewing a subsidiarity approach to
both jurisdiction and applicable law with respect to regional agreements. Parties
who choose to bring a dispute to the WTO instead of an applicable regional
102
agreement may simply be forum-shopping, or the WTO might be selected in
order to influence not only the conduct of the respondent state in a particular
dispute, but the evolution of the interpretation and application of WTO law
103
with respect to a broader set of trading partners. In either case, significant
recourse to regional trade agreement law might indeed be inappropriate from a
WTO perspective. There are, however, equally compelling reasons to
proactively incorporate (indeed, co-opt) regional systems into the WTO
104
through dispute settlement, with subsidiarity and deference as guiding
principles. Nonetheless, the approach pursued thus far in the WTO has been
decidedly nondeferential. This likely reflects a marriage of the WTO’s
insecurity vis-à-vis regionalism with the perception that regional agreements
(other than the EU) are not a relevant constituency—circumstances that induce
WTO adjudicators to adopt a policy of benign ignorance toward regional
systems. It remains to be seen whether this approach will be sustainable over
time, or whether a more subsidiarity-oriented approach will need to be
embraced.
IV
CONCLUSION: SUBSIDIARITY—A PLAYING FIELD, NOT A PRINCIPLE
In the WTO, the mechanics of subsidiarity, however implicit and at times
technical, are amply evident. In spite of this, it cannot be said that there is a
truly normatively principled or reasoned measure of allocating authority, as
subsidiarity may aspire to be. In these respects, subsidiarity, as an overarching
concept, is not very different from the more specific, yet indeterminate,
substantive and procedural principles that have been identified in this article as
the stuff subsidiarity and deference are made of, so long as its name is not
actually spoken—such as, exceptions, standards of review, opt-in and opt-out
design architecture, standards of review, burdens of proof, and more.
Subsidiarity is hardly a rule or a principle, unless it is clearly stated as one, with
clear parameters. It is rather a vernacular, a discursive device of negotiation
over power and authority among a multiplicity of actors, pulling and pushing in
different directions.
Tomer Broude, Fragmentation(s) of International Law: Normative Integration as Authority Allocation,
in SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY, SUBSIDIARITY: THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 99–120 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008).
102. Joost Pauwelyn & Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping before International Tribunals: (Real)
Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 77, 79–85 (2009).
103. Marc L. Busch, Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in
International Trade, 61 INT’L ORG. 735, 743 (2007).
104. See Henry Gao & Chin Leng Lim, Saving the WTO From the Risk of Irrelevance: The WTO
Dispute Settlement Mechanism as A ‘Common Good’ for RTA Disputes, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 899, 899–
901 (2008).
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Moreover, even in this sense—in the WTO and elsewhere —it is not
possible to state with any conviction or bona fides that subsidiarity, or
subsidiarity-like mechanisms, serve a clear vectorial function, whether
decentralizing or centralizing, centripetal or centrifugal. There is in practice a
much more nuanced, intricate interplay between subnational, national, regional,
plurilateral, and multilateral levels of policy and decisionmaking, in which
applications of subsidiarity are selectively and even strategically employed by
all involved. As a result, subsidiarity becomes not a trump, as it is sometimes
conceived, but a field of legal and political deliberation.
In this arena, the central or higher levels of governance may actually have
some counterintuitive advantages over the rest. After all, in the WTO but also
in other areas such as international human rights and investment protection,
normative indeterminacy goes hand in hand with political complexity. And in
these areas there is an additional, structural, institutional dimension to be
considered—the absence of a third-party with both the competence and the
capacity to determine the allocations of authority, for better or for worse. In the
EU, with its array of institutions, and in federal systems, courts sometimes serve
the purpose of drawing lines of power between federal and constituent entities.
In contrast, in the WTO, the obvious suspect for attracting authority
centralization is one and the same as the main arbiter of subsidiarity-like
authority allocation rules—the dispute settlement system. Seen this way, the
WTO Panels and AB can be likened to a cat guarding the milk. It is, however, a
cat still dependent on a willingly providing milkman without whom there would
be nothing to guard—a simple variant of the Hegelian Herrschaft und
106
Knechtschaft (Lordship and Bondage) dialectic. Indeed, subsidiarity can be
selective and the deference that comes with it is dialectic, certainly in the WTO,
but not only so; these are perhaps inherent attributes of the very concept itself.

105. See, e.g., Jachtenfuchs & Krisch, supra note 2, at 12 & n.47 (referencing Canadian Supreme
Court jurisprudence).
106. See G.W.G. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND, ch. IV.A (J.B. Baillie, trans.) (1910).

